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THE THESES AND PROGRAM BELOW aSK about judgment and tradition in a self-con-sciously plural world. The program points 
down a path I am currently exploring in a pair of 
texts, one on notions of identity in the history of 
philosophy, and one on the identity of buildings 
and places. The underlying issue of those texts 
is: what will replace the old notion of a parti-
cular identity? 
Places, persons, and communities do not and 
have never had such simple identities as our con-
cepts often made them out to have. But our world 
today defies the application of universal cate-
gories and judgments to fixed particulars. Our 
places and identities become complexly mul-
tiplied, they interpenetrate, the electronic no-
place / all-place opens before us. Yet at the same 
time exclusions and particularities assert them-
selves everywhere. 
If universal judgment seems unlikely, relati-
vism is one response, but relativism remains 
within the horizon of universals and particu-
lars. What kinds of identity can provide stand-
points for describing and judging today? 
Five Theses 
/. Architecture has a distinctive exposure 
to community judgment 
Architectural works obtrude into the physical 
context to a degree and with a permanence that 
other arts seldom accomplish. They are exposed 
to daily use, involved in different activities and 
interactions. They shape our lives, so judgment 
about them seems important. In planning and 
constructing architectural works many people 
cooperate. During this process intentions are 
explained; functions are evaluated; choices are 
made. Compared to the other arts, there is then 
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more evidence about the intentions and program 
behind the work and the choices made in its 
design. So judgment on these intentions and 
choices seems possible. Such community judg-
ment can range from public debate about the 
appropriateness of a new town hall, to learned 
professional critical discussion of the merits and 
demerits of a new project, to two people saying 
after a party that they would never live in That 
house. 
//. Architecture has a distinctive resistance 
to judgment 
Although statements of intention and program 
exist, they are texts that need interpretation. 
Perhaps there were unwritten agreements, per-
haps there were private intentions, perhaps the 
parties understood the terms differently, per-
haps the language has changed. No text is self-
interpreting. 
Although architectural works intrude into the 
public context, a context is not a predetermined 
and fully definite thing; it too needs interpreta-
tion, and the building may interpret the context 
as much as the context the building. 
Although buildings have more flanks expo-
sed to criticism, they tend to outlive their critics 
and the climate of opinion that judges them. 
Functions and modes of life change. Judgments 
that seemed firm lose their hold as time goes 
on. Grand old buildings become an embarrass-
ment because no suitable use can be found for 
them. "That house" becomes something to be 
preserved for its unique quirks. The "inappro-
priate" town hall becomes a symbol of our city. 
The work that violated the rules of a style be-
comes emblematic of a new style. 
///. Disagreement over standards cannot he 
legislated away 
Judges usually evaluate program and design 
choices on the basis of many sorts of criteria: 
massing, appearance, immediate reactions, com-
munity standards, previous experiences, notions 
of function, rules of design, philosophies of art, 
and so on. It is not automatically clear what 
aspects of the context are relevant and what 
previous works should be taken as precedents. 
There are many possible relations of similarity. 
Who will judge the judges? In today's commu-
nities the "we" that judges is not so unified. 
When there is disagreement about the stan-
dards of judgment, it is tempting but futile to 
insist that a building be judged only in this or 
that context or according to this one set of rules, 
because the differences may run too deep. For 
example, between Gothic and Classical in the 
nineteenth century there was no agreement on 
questions of style, but also about what should be 
the appropriate architectural precedents, which 
were the important similarities to be followed 
and functions to be filled, and ultimately about 
what the community was trying to be for itself. 
Attempting to avoid the nineteenth century's 
seemingly arbitrary choices of symbolism and 
rules, many modernists tried to determine uni-
versal standards based on a small number of 
overriding functions. But either this forcefully 
reduced the scope of life or the restrictions were 
swamped by the vitality of social life. That same 
vitality makes us realize that agreement over 
standards is not necessarily a good thing; there 
are levels and creativity and conflict within any 
community. Uniform judgments may express 
domination rather than consensus. 
IV. Judgment is not detached and arbitrary 
Another temptation is to see the judge as de-
tached from any of the possible sub-communi-
ties and criteria. Such a judge would first per-
form (or accept) some arbitrary act of interpre-
tation that established relations of similarity and 
precedent, thus defining the object and criteria 
of judgment. The myth of such a detached judge 
is the same as the myth of the architect as 
sovereign form-giver. 
Arbitrary choice does not create inhabita-
tion. We do not so freely locate ourselves; we 
find ourselves already within languages, forms 
of life, multiple ongoing projects and prece-
dents. Their multiplicity and our mode of being 
in them keeps us from any simple detachment. 
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V. Judgment is not pre-defined 
The multiplicity of our places and forms of life, 
and of our mode of being in them, also keeps us 
from simply enacting any pre-programmed 
judgment. Our being where we are does not 
mean that we are already in a position to deploy 
completely definite norms, precedents, and cri-
teria. The judging self, the community, the buil-
ding, its norms, and the contexts are all involved 
together, but not as pre-defined items. Neither 
we nor the buildings are fully definite standing 
around available for judgment. Not all activity is 
on the side of the judging subject. Buildings act 
too; they can judge themselves and they can 
change us, and this beyond the intentions and 
choices of their design. The work is always in 
progress. 
A Program 
Many difficulties arise in thinking about archi-
tectural judgment and inhabitation because we 
rely on the categories of universal and particu-
lar. Our universal activity defines the particular. 
Or, our particular desires are universalized into 
standards. Or, judgment is a matter of finding 
the right universal concepts, or the right particu-
lar application of a given universal concept. If 
the judge's criteria are local to another particu-
lar group, what is their authority here? If they are 
universal and substantive, is there a universal 
community they speak for? If they are universal 
and formal, how do they get their content? Judg-
ment seems to be torn between universal rules 
that have an obscure relation to local content, 
and a particularity that can lead to an enfeebling 
relativism. We see both of these today, as well as 
mixtures of the two as in standardized histori-
cal postmodernism. 
In architectural criticism and philosophy de-
bate tends to oscillate between these extremes 
and there are various philosophical and critical 
strategies for trying to blunt the alternatives. In 
politics we are familiar with attempts today to 
assert universal standards, and with sometimes 
violent attempts to assert purified local parti-
cularisms. What those opposed trends have in 
common is a defense of the opposition between 
universal and particular against a more multiple 
identity for places. 
The identity of places is not well described by 
the traditional opposition between universal and 
particular. The way places become definite is not 
by assembling particular pre-defined details nor 
by particularizing a pre-given universal essence. 
If inhabitation is more than particularizing a 
universal identity, then the judgment whether 
something is appropriate involves another kind 
of discernment than applying a universal rule. 
If the identity of places and people is not well 
described as a collection of particulars, then 
judgment is more than the collision of particu-
lar desires with or over particular objects. 
Discussing the problem of finding criteria 
for judging forms of life and consciousness, 
Hegel said "consciousness simultaneously dis-
tinguishes itself from something, and at the 
same time relates itself [in its own being] to it" 
{Phenomenology of Spirit, Introduction, para-
graph 82). There is no one-way judging dis-
tance. Building, place, judge, and community 
are linked; for Hegel the ensemble evaluates it-
self when it tries to become actual and definite. 
When the culture, or the building, or the judge 
tries to "posit i t se l f as definite and affirmative 
it discovers built-in tensions and transgressions 
within its criteria and its presumed wholeness. 
It judges itself by its transitions towards some-
thing different and more inclusive. For Hegel 
there is a necessity to this process, based on the 
development of structures of reason, and this 
leads through many stages to a self-conscious 
community whose inhabitation encompasses di-
vision and negation without being torn apart. 
This Hegelian dream seems a quixotic and 
metaphysical goal today. On the one hand, we 
find around us what Hegel would see as relap-
ses into too easy affirmation of simple universal 
norms, or of given particularities. On the other 
hand, we declare our age post-modern. Some of 
that post-modernism is yet another easy histo-
ricism. But a mutated audacious variant of He-
gel's gesture appears in deconstructive claims 
IDENTITY AND JUDGMENT 39 
about the necessary transgression involved in 
any posited unity or the necessary homelessness 
within any dwelling. Self-deconstruction and 
Hegelian self-consolidation both refuse to iso-
late the judge, or the building. Both seek kinds of 
necessity that are not the application of univer-
sal rules to particular cases. For both, the buil-
ding judges itself when it tries to do what it 
seems to be, and this judgment does not reduce 
to a detached subject measuring the fulfillment 
of a function. For both, there is no simple given 
identity to places and selves - or to buildings. 
Could we rethink the particularity of places 
as neither simply given nor simply constructed 
(or judged) by an active subjectivity? Could we 
follow the suggestion that self and place become 
definite, in varying rhythms, together, yet with-
out falling into Hegel's sometimes extreme 
holism or into deconstruction's sometime ex-
treme resentment of unity? 
Like many people, I remember as a child 
dying to write my full address in concentric 
circles: David Kolb, 36 Kenwood Road, Garden 
City, Nassau County, Long Island, New York, 
U.S.A., North America, Western Hemisphere, 
Earth, Solar System, Milky Way Galaxy, The 
Local Group, The Universe. That neat concen-
tric hierarchy made me feel both very important 
and very insignificant. That hierarchy included 
many systems of objects, but few places as I 
would define them now. Now I would have a 
hard time writing my full address, for I live in 
many places at once that are not concentric nor 
stacked into neat levels. They intersect at angles 
and lie together at foldings and are open and 
closed to one another in complex ways without 
exclusive borders. My inhabitation is multiple, 
and that multiplicity is not just an additive se-
ries of smaller seamless inhabitations. Even the 
single places are fractured; they are not defi-
nite particulars resting easily under universals. 
Which is not to say that the places are indefi-
nite, only that it is difficult to find ways to think 
their identity and interrelation. This complica-
tes judgment but does not make it disappear. For 
within those multiple places, perhaps as a con-
dition of their standing together, there are some 
norms that go beyond particular local preferen-
ces yet are not of some universal place. 
What would judgment enact in a space that is 
not structured according to universal and parti-
cular? It would not repeat a movement of sove-
reign constitution. Passing judgment would not 
be the authoritative act of the official critic (or 
of rivals for that status). The judge would not 
stand passing sentence based on the final uni-
versal or the dominating particular. Perhaps there 
would be judgment on architectural works in 
the way we might assay a craft object for its 
workability and for the way it speaks to us while 
also forming us. That judgment would not be 
univocal, for our identity is not simple. There 
would also be judgment in the way a place or 
a building articulates the complexity of its iden-
tity and of our inhabitation. 
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